

Annex B to
ACT/JFD/TT-2827/SER:NU
dated May 20

**Questionnaire for Directors of COEs
regarding COVID-19 Observations**

Introduction

This questionnaire is intended to leverage the specific expertise of the COEs during the COVID-19 crisis in order to understand what issues have occurred. Such understanding will support NATO in identifying actions to be taken at the strategic level.

The questionnaire is divided into two topic areas which aim to discover observations specifically related to the role of your COE's area of expertise (e.g., the role of C2, the role of Cyber, etc.) in:

1. a future similar crisis or the transformation of that area of expertise in general; and
2. the various responses to the COVID-19 crisis.

Please note that this questionnaire supplements, rather than replaces, the NATO Lessons Learned (LL) process, and we encourage the continued use of the LL Portal to submit Observations and Lessons Identified, whether they be strategic, operational or tactical in nature.

Instructions

If a particular question is not applicable to your COE, a response of "N/A" or "not applicable" is welcome. Responses can be entered directly where indicated with no character limit. If parts of the answer are classified (above NATO Unclassified), please mark the classified paragraphs in your response as follows NR-NATO Restricted, NC-NATO Confidential, NS-NATO Secret and return your response on the NS WAN.

Exact responses will be treated as confidential and non-attributable. Therefore, we encourage a candid approach to responding.

Please return the completed questionnaire NLT 26 June 2020 directly to the JALLC POC for this collection effort, Ms Katie Mauldin, Senior Operational Research Analyst, Katie.mauldin@jallc.nato.int (internet or NS).

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Topic Area 1: **Observations related to your COE's area of expertise and its role (e.g., the role of C2, the role of Cyber, etc.) in a future similar crisis and/or the transformation of that area of expertise in general.**

1. Have capabilities or mechanisms been used in unexpected/unplanned ways in response to the crisis (e.g., in Nations' response, other organizations' responses, etc.)? If so, please discuss how the use of such capabilities was effective/ineffective.

In response to the crisis, the Military Police have been used to help other services/stakeholders with the following activities:

- helping border guard in monitoring traffic on the border checkpoints or taking part in mixed patrols along the border;
- joint patrols and established checkpoints with the police to monitor compliance with COVID-19 restrictions;
- Military Police monitor military personnel, and in some cases civilians, who are under home quarantine;
- provide conveying within mobility support for medical equipment;
- provide support in relocating of field hospitals, etc.
- UAVs used to monitor the appointed areas, control of home quarantine or convincing individuals to get back to their homes. What is more, using thermal cameras enables identification of people with a fever.

All of the above-mentioned activities are seen as **EFFECTIVE**. However, cooperation with other services depends on the procedures and defined rules of engagement of the Military Police. In each case, a human factor must be taken into consideration.

2. What observations are there regarding the impact on existing capabilities or capability development in your COE's area of expertise throughout the crisis?

During the pandemic the Military Police performed their standard activities (e.g. patrols, checkpoints, mobility support or policing, etc.). However, the biggest change regarding the new crisis situation was cooperation with other services (State Police, Border Guard, Municipal Police, Health Service). The Military Police cooperates with this services on a daily basis, however the pandemic resulted in the extended scope of tasks in different fields of responsibility. Experience from previous cooperation was very useful, yet, new procedures had to be applied to maximise the effort of the above-mentioned services and MP.

Furthermore, it was found that initial/basic training regarding procedures and safety with reference to "new" tasks is useful and can result in better preparation for fulfilling tasks.

Moreover, during the review of MP capabilities and functions regarding COVID-19, new challenges were defined.

The importance of cyber domain increased. Social distancing and home office showed how significant influence on our work and life cyber world has. To avoid direct contact, units/institutions started to use VTCs instead of standard meetings, e-learning substituted basic training, and webinars became the first alternative for conferences and exchange of subject matter expertise. That is why more online solutions/events are taken in consideration for the upcoming years. What is more, the increase of e-learning courses is planned. To use the above-mentioned functions, IT infrastructure has to be reviewed, especially in the context of security of networks and data within them. Mobile/ home office information exchange, compared with standard office work, brings more cyber threats because permanent network connections supported by NATO are secured much better than average civilian networks used at homes.

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In some cases, there was a problem with the logistic support concerning personal protection of equipment or IT equipment which has impact on task fulfilment and of course on the physical health or cyber security.

Closed borders, not only during the pandemic but also in other situations, becomes a challenge for freedom of movement. Procedures and international agreements should be in place so that free transfer of troops to designated areas is ensured whenever NATO needs to respond or defense within its Area of Responsibility.

Another challenge is dealing with detainees and captured personnel (CPERS). Prisons and detention facilities face the most serious and heightened threat of multiple COVID-19 outbreaks. To provide a safe and secure environment for its own troops and other detained individuals, infected entities MUST be isolated from others. What is more, posted medical personnel and guards have to apply specific precautionary measures. This situation requires a bigger effort of the force (increased number of personnel and infrastructure adjustment).

3. In what ways has innovation played a role in your COE's area of expertise throughout the crisis?

The use of cyber domain advantages really helps dealing with everyday tasks in headquarters and institutions. It helps to communicate and coordinate activities among the community of interest, exchange information and collect Lessons Learned from this crisis situation.

The pandemic proves that online solutions are highly important and we have to be ready to use them (IT infrastructure, software, know-how). Thus, it is needed to develop/enhance capabilities in this sphere in each headquarters/organisation.

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Topic Area 2: **Observations related to your COE's area of expertise and its role (e.g., the role of C2, the role of Cyber, etc.) in the various responses to the COVID-19 crisis.**

1. What mechanisms and/or capabilities have seemed effective/ineffective in supporting the military responses of Allies and/or Partners? And the civil responses of Allies and/or Partners?

EFFECTIVE:

- monitoring of the borders by military personnel, including MP, helps to prevent unauthorised border crossing by individuals;
- monitoring of home quarantine proved that some individuals under quarantine do not obey restrictions;
- mobile applications help to monitor home quarantine by avoiding direct contact with potentially infected individuals;
- mobility support activities, including medical equipment convoys, helped in faster and safer transportation of requested goods.
- using UAV/drone (see area 1 point 1) can be recognised as best practice;
- CCTV installations with AI (artificial intelligence) capable to recognise faces or body temperature (thermal image) with a high accuracy could help to protect military/ critical infrastructure facilities against unauthorised penetration, including infected personnel;

INEFFECTIVE:

- one of the nations in their response to the MP LL research questionnaire provided the information about insufficient support in terms of protecting equipment for the Military Police. On a daily basis, MP are not equipped with various protection means. Thus, it is recommended to equip MP service with above-mentioned equipment in advance to provide proper precautionary measures;

2. What mechanisms for coordination and cooperation with Allies and Partners, including International Organizations, have seemed effective/ineffective?

EFFECTIVE:

- social distancing caused that all online solutions are seen as a good mechanism for coordination and cooperation. Although some residential events were cancelled or postponed advantages of cyber domain are used. Nowadays, VTCs replaced face to face meetings, and Webinars complement forums, workshops or conferences. Nevertheless, physical interaction ensures better relationship and networking building;
- e-learning (ADL) courses have a new meaning. Personnel can be trained by the use of online software features;
- ACT Lessons Learned project regarding COVID-19, and complementary “the Military Police LL research regarding COVID-19 pandemic” are very good practices to collect and share observations among NATO and its partner structures. This LL initiative triggered entities to be more active in this field. Furthermore, the outcome of the research will bring some changes at all levels from the tactical to strategic levels.

INEFFECTIVE:

- due to the classification of some documents in headquarters, staffing during home office was not possible to be completed on time. Thus, more mobile/ out of office solutions for securing classified networks have to be taken in consideration. It will allow personnel to work on classified documents outside the unit/ headquarters.

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3. What are the impacts, identified or potential, on Allies' and/or Partners' force employment in response the crisis?

As it was mentioned in area 1 point 1 the Military Police had to or have to work on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in case of any contact with infected individuals.

What is more, logistic support is important – MP servicemen have to be equipped with personal protection equipment (gloves, face masks, special clothes, etc.) - see area 2 point 1.

4. What challenges and/or best practices have been observed in coordinating and communicating with other parts of NATO?

Within a few months of lockdown it was noticed that entities used different commercial software for VTCs (GoToMeeting, ZOOM, CISCO WEBEX, Microsoft Team). NATO structures could provide recommendations for particular software taking in consideration security of the transfer and other technical features.

Undeniably, all lessons learned projects regarding countering COVID-19 are the best practice. Collected knowledge and experience will be useful for future engagements in such crises.

Please provide any other relevant observations that you wish to share.

Further info about the Military Police Community of Interest experiences with COVID-19 will be provided after a deeper analysis.

Moreover, experience on COVID-19 crisis response will be taken into account during works on the MP Future Capabilities Development

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